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I. INTRODUCTION
A Proposals for Monetan' Accommodation of Imported inflation
A SUBSTANTIAL PART of the escalation of inflation in 1973
and 1974 was attributed to foreign influences. Crop failures abroad put pressure on
limited world supplies of grains and soybeans. The synchronous expansion of many
industrial economies increased the demand for basic metals. And the OPEC oil
cartel quadrupled the price of crude petroleum. U.S. wholesale prices of the
manufacturing sector as measured here rose 17 percent per year in 1973 and 1974.
To the extent that such major price increases were due to foreign influences, it
appeared that they could not be immediately prevented by domestic monetary
restraint. This traditional policy response to escalating inflation appeared some-
how inappropriate, and the Federal Reserve was urged to "accommodate" the
foreign-induced price increases, that is, supply the monetary growth needed to
sustain the higher prices resulting from foreign influences [13,15,171.'If, instead,
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monetary restraint were to put downward pressure on all domestic prices until the
foreign-induced increases in the domestic price level were reversed, the pressure
would produce a prolonged period of economic slack and reduced output. The
proper conduct of monetary policy in the face of such developments remains
an unsettled issue.
What was the difference between price increases due to foreign influences and
those due to domestic excess demand that allegedly called for accommodation in
the former case and traditional monetary restraint in the latter? It could norbe
simply that foreign demands for U.S. goods had increased, as might happen if the
rate of inflation abroad exceeded the domestic rate or if foreign demands shifted to
particular U.S. products. For monetary restraint is intended and traditionally used to
stabilize aggregate demand for domestic output from whatever source, and in this
case the restraint would be aided by its tendency to appreciate the dollar exchange
rate and thus to moderate the foreign demands and cheapen imports. Policymakers
might, of course, err in the attempt to stabilize fluctuations in aggregate demand and
then have to decide whether to continue to accommodate undesired movements in
the price level, but that decision arises with any destabilizing change in aggregate
demand and is not particular to foreign influences.
Furthermore, a policy of accommodation would be inappropriate if previous
monetary expansion had produced domestic inflationary pressures that were causing
the exchange rate to depreciate and dollar prices of imports to rise to match the
advance in domestic prices. For then the price increases and the consequent
depreciation of the exchange rate reflect a monetary expansion that has already
occurred, and further expansion to accommodate lagging price increases is not
needed to sustain aggregate output.
The argument for accommodation in 1973—74, as I understand it. pertained to
prices of input materials determined in world markets. The OPEC cartel increased
the dollar price of crude petroleum and so raised costs to producers of petroleum
products. The world demand for grains and soybeans raised their dollar prices.
These influences on prices of world-traded goods were direct—in contrast to
indirect effects on U.S. aggregate demand and prices which international de-
velopments can induce through changes in domestic income or money supply. To
be sure, some world developments may have no effect on U.S. prices because
an accompanying change in the exchange rate leaves the average dollar price
of imports and exports unchanged. But that did not happen in 1973 or later.
One reason was that the volume of both imports and exports increased, to that
extent canceling their separate effects on the exchange rate; arid another reason
was that petroleum imports were associated with short-term capital imports, sub-
stantially reducing the effect on the exchange rate. As a result, U.S. prices of
many world-traded materials rose sharply and increased the costs of using them
to manufacturing industries.
An important part of the accommodation proposal is the belief that monetary
restraint cannot prevent world price increases from initially passing through toPHILLIP CAGAN : 3
output prices.2 To some extent the escalation of inflation due to foreign influences
elicits an increase in expenditures; the temporary response to sudden price increases
is to spend more and to undertake the required cutbacks gradually. Even though
aggregate expenditures will be determined by monetary growth in the long run, the
private economy can partially support higher prices in the short run by a temporary
rise in monetary velocity. But the accommodation proposal does not rest on such a
difference between long-run and short-run behavior. The crucial supposition of the
proposal is that exogenous increases in costs pass rapidly through to output prices.
To the extent that aggregate expenditures are deficient, the cost-induced price in-
creases produce a decline in goods sold and output. If policy does not accom-
modate the world price increases, they must eventually be offset by decreases in
prices of other goods to achieve the price level consistent with aggregate demand.
Given an ongoing rate of inflation, the offset does not require prices to decline but
only to rise less rapidly. Demand pressure to reduce the rate of increase of prices is
eventually successful, but it works slowly and requires a prolonged period of slack
demand and reduced output.
A policy of accommodation is therefore based on the apparent asymmetry of
price response, in which supply effects on prices occur rapidly and demand
effects—at least for many industries—occur slowly.3 If this difference in timing
did not exist, the absence of monetary accommodation should largely nullify
the inflationary effects of exogenous cost increases when they occur or shortly
afterward. The reasons for such asymmetry are not clear. Although demand
shifts are hard to identify and may tend to be disregarded until with time the lasting
shifts become apparent, prices of many materials are highly variable and the
permanence of changes is also uncertain. Perhaps the difference between demand
and supply effects in many industries is that demand effects may or may not cover
the entire industry, whereas supply effects generally do, and that producers make
price adjustments readily when they believe competitors are similarly affected and
not otherwise.
In any event, the escalation of U.S. inflation in 1973 and 1974 was led by
world-traded goods and the products made from them. Monetary growth was
reduced and the usual signs of a tight monetary policy appeared, reflecting an un-
usually sharp decline in the real value of money balances due to slower monetary
growth and higher inflation. The recession of 1973—75producedappreciable slack
in the economy but, from all appearances, did not reverse the higher levelofprices
2lhis ignores thecrucialrole of expectations held by the public about future price movements and
about theresponse ofmonetary policy. If it were believed that monetary growth would remainconstant.
thiswouldinfluence theexpected long-run path ofprices which,inturn,wouldinfluence short-run
price movements.
3An increase in the world price for an exported product has both demand and supply effects, of course,
The domestic price is raised from the demand side, and this in tum increases the costs to firms using the
product as an input. In addition, the increase in foreign demand may increase domestic incomes and
affect international financial flows. No precise definition of different effects is intended here.
A separate question is whether there is asymmetry between price increases and decreases, which we do
not address. See Goldstein 191, who found mixed indications of such asymmetry for the United States.4 : MONEY, CREDIT, ANDBANKING
resultingfrom the 1973—74 escalation. The recession, though severe, removed only
the blip in the rateofinflation, reducing it to consistency with the average rate of
monetary growth. The runup in the level of prices had apparently been partially
accommodated, whether intentionally or not, by a reduction in output, a speedup
in monetary growth in 1975 and after, and an increase in monetary velocity 15,101.
The purpose of the present study is to measure the amount of price increase that
the proposals for accommodation required in 1973—74. Presumably such an es-
timate of the amount could be made in time to act on it. Whether accommodation
is a desirable policy is not addressed here. Consistently followed, it would result in
a higher long-run rate of inflation, because there are not likely to be nearly enough
episodes of deflationary accommodation to offset the inflationary ones. Notwith-
standing the appeal in the short run to accept inflationary fait accompli in order to
avoid prolonged economic slack, one may have strong reservations about the
long-run consequences on expectations of following such a policy.
B. The Measurement of Imported Inflation
Most previous studies of foreign influences in 1973—74 are based on time-series
regressions of aggregate data. The U.S. inflation rate is regressed on a set of
independent variables including a proxy for domestic aggregate demand and the rate
of change of U.S. import prices. The latter variable is intended to represent
exogenous foreign influences. The studies generally find that import prices account
for around half of the U.S. inflation rate in l973—74. These regression estimates
incorporate all the influences correlated with import prices and do not distinguish
among the possible sources. It is left unclear whether the estimated influence
includes a rise in the cost of imported materials, a rise in export prices that
affected input materials and final products, and a substitution effect and feedback
of such price increases on other prices and wages. A policy of accommodating
imported inflation would not necessarily intend to cover all such increases.
An alternative method of estimation is to focus on foreign increases in the cost of
input materials. One such study by Federal Reserve economists [11 estimated the
effect on industry input costs of the 1971 devaluation of the dollar and additional
increases in prices (actually, unit values) of imports, and derived from the
input-output matrix the corresponding increase in the price index of personal
4Vanous studies from which such estimates can be readily derived have come to my attention. (1)
Weintraub 118. Tables 10 and II, pp. 30—31] finds that an import price variable accounts for 44 percent
of the increase in consumer prices 1973—74. (2> Modigliani and Papademos [13. p. 10] find that variables
for farm and import prices combined account for 60 percent of the increase in consumer prices excluding
food in 1974. (3) Dewald and Marchon [7, p. 38] find that import prices account for 46 percent of the
increase in the GNP deflator 1973—74. (4) Keran and Riordan [II. pp. 10—lI] find that dollar export
prices of industrial countries have a regression coefficient of 0.16 in an equation explaining consumer
price changes and of 0.41 in an equation explaining wholesale price changes. If these coefficients are
applied to the rate of increase of the world-traded input price index for 1973—74 in Table I. the induced
increase in 1973—74 in consumer prices is 5.7 percent per year and in wholesale prices is 14.7 percent per
year. These are 54 and 86 percent. respectively, of the actual increase in the consumer price index and in
the manufacturing index of Table 1. (5) Levy [12, p. 33] attributes roughly 60 percent" of inflation in
the GNPdeflatorfrom second half of 1971 to second half of 1974 to international shocks. (6) Fair 8,
p. 31 [ reports an "impact effect" of import prices on the private nonfarm deflator of about one-quarter in
1973—74 but a long-run effect much greater.PHILLIP CAGAN :5
consumption. They found that 28 percent of the increase in personal consumption
prices from third-quarter 1971 to second-quarter 1974 was due to these foreign
influences. That is about half of the effect found by regression methods. What
accounts for the difference? Since the Fed study excluded increases in export prices
and was based on other assumptions, there are a variety of possible explanations,
not to mention a possible overestimate by the regression studies.5
The present study provides another estimate to clarify these questions. it is also
based on the cost of input materials and the input-output matrix, but includes input
materials that are partly exported and selects those affected by foreign influences in
a different way. The Fed study covered all imports and attributed their rise in unit
value to foreign influences. Here we derive for each input material the fraction of
total domestic supply that is imported or exported, and those of 20 percent or more
are assumed to have their prices determined entirely abroad and those less than
20 percent, entirely domestically.6 This dividing line, though somewhat arbitrary,
makes a plausible division of the distribution of inputs and gives results, as it
turns out, that fall reasonably in between the Fed and regression estimates.
2. THE DATA AND METHOD OF ESTIMATION
My estimation of inflation imported from abroad involved several steps. First, it
was necessary to construct price indexes of output and of input materials for
individual industries. This was done for fifty-four industries covering three-fourths
of the manufacturing sector. The prices were wholesale product prices. Second, the
lag patterns of the price effects of input materials on output were estimated for each
industry, holding wages constant, by quarterly time-series regressions. Third, the
price effect of world-traded input goods was calculated for each industry, assuming
cost increases were passed through dollar for dollar. The effects of these
foreign-induced price increases in each industry were then fed through an
input-output matrix, allowing for lags, to derive the second and subsequent-round
increases in output prices, which incorporate the higher costs passed on by
intermediate products to other industries. From the cumulative price effects in each
industry, a quarterly index of output prices was derived for the manufacturing sector
for comparison with the actual index.
The first step of constructing price indexes is described in Appendix A. For the
second step, a quarterly regression for each industry was used to estimate the time
5Thisstudy also presented results of a simulation of the full FederalReserve model forimportand
export price effects, and the estimated increase in consumer prices was the same as the input-output
estimate for import price effects alone: the additional demand effects in the model simulation offset the
export price effects. However, the model simulation raised the contribution of the 1971 devaluation to
the total rise in consumer prices from 4 percent to I 5 percent.
5These fractions, it may be noted, do not provide a basis for allocating the determination of a price
partly abroad and partly domestically. That the U.S. domestic supply of a product that is imported or
exported was 50 percent. for example. does not mean that its price is determined half abroad and half
domestically: the foreign 50 percent may represent a large or small part of the world market. Moreover,
since in most cases there is little or no difference between the foreign and domestic price of a product.
It cannot be said that 50 percent of the same increase in price was determined abroad and the remain-
der domestically.6 MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING
pattern of effects of total materials costs on output prices, holding straight-time
hourly earnings constant.7 The period of fit was third-quarter 1968 to first-quarter
1975. World-traded and domestic materials costs were assumed to have the same
lag effects and were combined. Earnings were expressed as the percentage change
over the preceding four quarters; its regression coefficient was predetermined to be
equal to the ratio of employee compensation to total shipments in the industry. The
lag patterns for materials costs were constrained to a length of three quarters, based
on preliminary experimentation that indicated that this length was sufficient to cover
the main effects. Three separate variables were therefore used for materials costs,
one the percentage change for the concurrent quarter and one each for the two
preceding quarters; the sum of their regression coefficients was constrained to equal
the ratio of intermediate inputs to total shipments in the industry. These coefficients
form the lag patterns for input prices. These patterns were used to distribute the
effects of cost increases over time, but they do not influence the cumulative effect
beyond the three quarters of the lag. The lag estimates are given in [41.
Theprice increases of each industry in response to higher prices of world-traded
input materials work to raise input costs to other industries. These in turn produce
higher costs for other industries, and so on. The cumulative effects of the initial
cost increases can be derived with the use of the inverted input-output matrix
redefined to cover the fifty-four industries. The details of the derivation are de-
scribed in Appendix B. The cumulative effects on the output prices of the in-
dividual industries were combined into a weighted index for the manufacturing
sector. The weights were the contribution of each industry to final demand in the
1967 input-output matrix.8
For the cumulative effects derived here, changes in prices of world-traded inputs
were treated as exogenous and as given by the indexes constructed for these items,
prices of all other input materials purchased from uncovered industries were as-
sumed to change in the same proportion as the prices of the inputs purchased from
the fifty-four covered industries, and prices of all other inputs (services, labor, and
other value-added items) were assumed not to change.
The assumption of no price change for service inputs and value-added items is
important and would alter the results substantially if relaxed. The multiplier effect
of an initial cost increase is raised without limit as the feedback expands. If wages
rose in proportion to the cost of living without a lag, the cumulative multiplier
would be quite large. The multiplier is moderate—about two—when it is confined
as here to the feedback from materials prices only. An important difference between
materials prices and wages is that the latter are generally constrained by explicit
7Straight-timehourly earnings were calculated by dividing BLS worker weekly payrolls by hours and
assuming that overtime hours were paid time and a half. The BLS kindly supplied unpublished overtime
hours for some of the industries. The series for four-digit SIC industries. weighted by 1967 gross output.
were adjusted to the coverage of industries used here.
HThe 1967 10 matrix was reconstructed to conform Co the coverage of industries for the price indexes.
Secondary outputs were not transferred to the primary producers of each product. as is done in the
published tables, but were left as part of the output of the original producing industr\. The reason was to
reflect the actual production n each industry, on which the materials inputs are based, including the
production of joint products.PHILLIP CAGAN : 7
or implicit contracts that delay their adjustment to unanticipated cost-of-living
increases. Whereas the policy of accommodation assumes that higher materials -
costsare quickly passed through to output prices, the assumption to be made about
nonmaterials costs, particularly wages, is not clear. Certainly not all feedback
effects via wages can be accommodated, since some foreign price increases imply
a fall in real wages. The measure here pertains to a limited policy in which no
increases in nonmaterials costs are accommodated.
3. ESTIMATES OF IMPORTED INFLATION
Table 1 gives the cumulative effects of world-traded inputs on output prices
(equation (4) in Appendix B) for the covered manufacturing sector. The world-
traded input prices were held constant after fourth-quarter 1974 and the contribu-
tion calculated a year beyond in order to capture all of the lagged effects. Their
contribution continued to raise output prices for several quarters after the end of
1974. The input costs have a lagged effect covering three quarters, though most
of the effect occurs in the first two. The lag tends to stretch out their contribution
to output prices.
World-traded input prices rose twice as fast as output prices, as shown by
the rates of change at the bottom of Table I. It was the more rapid rise of the
world-traded input prices that fostered the view that the escalation of inflation in
1973—74 was in part imported from abroad, and this in turn raised the issue of
accommodation. The large increase in world-traded input prices produced, over the
period as a whole, a substantial cost-push effect on output prices. The rise of
TABLE I
PRICEINDEXES OF WORLD-TRADED GOODS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MANUFACTURING




Effect on Manufactunng Index of Won
Cbd







100.0 1972. I 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
II 101.6 101.2 101.2 100.1 101.3 100.9
III 106.9 102.2 102.2 100.2 102.4 101.7
IV 115.6 105.5 105.5 100.9 106.4 103.1
1973. 1 125.2 106.8 100.0 106.8 101.5 108.4 106.7
H 157.7 107.1 100.4 107.5 103.1 110.8 109.6
III 155.6 107.0 100.6 108.3 105.4 114.2 111.0
IV 165.0 106.9 101.9 108.9 105.6 115.0 114.2
1974. I 192.4 108.2 103.7 112.2 104.5 117.2 121.6
II 189.9 108.6 104.4 113.4 104.4 118.4 128.3
III 212.1 108.8 104.5 113.7 104.7 119.1 137.0
-IV 213.4 108.9 104.6 113.9 104.8 119.4 141.2
1975. IV 108.9 104.7 114.0 105.1 119.8
Annual Rates of Change (percent)
1973—74 35.9 1.6 2.3 3.9 1.9 5.9 17.08 :MONEY,CREDIT, AND BANKING
world-traded input prices of 113.4 percent from 1972 to 1974 raised output prices
19.8 percent, which was half of the actual rise in the manufacturing index of 41.2
percent. Foods and foreign petroleum together accounted for three-fourths of this
effect. Although metals were also thought to be an important contributor to the
inflationary outburst of 1973, most of them have a world-traded fraction less than
20 percent, and those with a fraction of 20 percent and above accounted for only 1 .2
percentage points (not shown separately) of the rise in the manufacturing index.
The table shows a larger effect of world-traded inputs than the actual rise in
the manufacturing index until the end of 1973. Apparently food prices, the main
contributor in 1972—73, had a smaller or slower effect than is estimated here.
The table shows the effect of the entire increase in world prices. If we suppose
that general inflationary pressures stemming from worldwide growth in aggregate
demand were responsible for an equal rise in prices of world-traded and domestic
goods, only the additional price increases of world-traded goods can be attributed
to a separate international influence on prices. From this point of view, we may
determine what the rise in prices would have been had the separate international
developments been absent. The ratio of the effect on output prices to the initiating
increase in world-traded input prices in 1972—74 was 19.8/113.4 (Table 1). We may
apply the same proportional effect to the part of these world price increases that was
in excess of the general inflation. If the same basic rise in prices Bapplied
to both world and domestic goods, we may adjust the actual manufacturing rise
of 41.2 percent as follows:
B= 41.2—(113.4—B)19.8/l13.4
The basic increase B was therefore 25.9 percent. The additional increase of world
prices of (113.4 —25.9=)87.5percent raised output prices an additional (87.5
x 19.8/113.4 =)15.3percent or four-tenths (15.3/41.2) of the total increase.
This result pertains to manufactured goods and therefore is somewhat higher than
would be a comparable contribution to the output of all sectors including services.
for which world-traded inputs are fewer. Hence this estimate suggests a somewhat
smaller contribution than the one-half obtained by most of the regression studies
that pertained to consumer prices. It is somewhat larger than the Federal Reserve
estimate, but the latter excluded world-traded inputs that are exported and pertained
to consumer prices and a slightly earlier period. Based on the relation between
imports and exports for the input materials covered in the present study (exports are
three-fourths of imports by input weight), we may conjecture that the Fed study, if
expanded to cover exports, would have found the foreign contribution to be
three-fourths greater than the 28 percent reported or about 50 percent, similar to the
regression studies. However, the Fed study treated the price increases of all imports
greater than the ongoing rate of inflation as exogenous to the U.S. economy,
which surely leads to an overestimate. The lower estimate of the present study,
therefore, seems to be in the right direction.
If the comparison between the present input-output estimate and those from otherPHILLIP CAGAN9
studies is valid, we may conclude that the passing through of higher input costs
from world-traded materials as defined here accounts for a large part but not all of
the foreign effect estimated in the regressions. The foreign influence in 1973—74
was therefore mainly an effect of world prices on production costs. The regressions
apparently picked up an additional effect on the aggregate demand for domestic
products and part of the feedback on wages. It is doubtful that a policy of ac-
commodation would want to include these additonal effects, though whether it
could avoid doing so is another question.
The increases in costs due to foreign developments had a multiplier effect on
domestic output prices. World-traded prices rose 113.4 percent in 1972—74 as
noted. These products comprised 18.8 percent of total input materials in the covered
industries, as shown by Table 2 in Appendix A, and such inputs were 54 percent of
the value of total shipments. Hence the foreign-induced increases in costs were
(113.4 x 0.188 x 0.54 =)11.5percent, and they raised output prices 19.8
percent or by a multiple of 1 .7. Any accommodation of materials-cost increases
with a similar set of input weights, therefore, would result in a rise of output prices
by almost twice the average cost increase.
4. SUMMARY AND SOME CONCLUSIONS
Proposals to accommodate inflation due to foreign influences presume a response
of prices that is faster for supply than for demand effects. Accommodation pertains
to direct foreign influences on prices from the supply side, and presumably not
to indirect effects on domestic aggregate demand, which it is the usual objective
of demand management to stabilize.
How much of the 1973—74 inflation should have been accommodated under such
proposals is not clear. The present study estimated the cumulative increase in an
index of U.S. manufacturing prices (covering three-fourths of the manufacturing
sector) that was due initially to price increases of world-traded materials. World
price increases from first-quarter 1971 to fourth-quarter 1974 raised the manufactur-
ing index by 20 percent, which was half the actual increase. Three-fourths of that
contribution was due to foods and foreign crude petroleum. But part of the increases
in world prices reflected the ongoing inflation and did ndf contribute to its esca-
lation. When we allow for a common rate of inflation, their contribution in ex-
cess of the common increase was 15 percent or four-tenths of the total increase.
This estimate pertains to the manufacturing sector. A comparable estimate for the
entire economy would be somewhat lower. This is a rough estimate; a precise
measurement of foreign-price influences does not appear possible.
These results appear reasonably consistent with a similar Federal Reserve study
and dissimilar regression estimates and suggest an interpretation of the differences.
The Fed estimate was lower because it pertained to all consumer prices but mainly
because it excluded input materials that are partly exported. A rough correction for
this exclusion makes the Fed estimate higher than the four-tenths of the present10 : MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING
study, a difference attributable to the treatment in the Fed study of the prices of all
imports as exogenous. The regression estimates were higher, apparently because
they included some demand effects and feedback on service prices and wages.
Based on the present estimate, accommodation of imported inflation, if confined
solely to the direct foreign-price effects on input-materials costs and their multi-
plier of about two, would have supported about four-tenths of the total rise in
manufacturing prices in 1973—74 and somewhat less of the rise in consumer prices.
Since consumer prices rose more than twice as fast in 1973—74 as in 1971—72,
accommodation of the previous trend rate of inflation plus about four-tenths of the
total rise in prices owing to the foreign influences required monetary support for
almost a doubling of the inflation rate in 1973—74. Whether intentionally or not, it
does appear that, despite the severe 1973—75 recession, most of the spurt in the level
of prices in 1973—74 was eventually accommodated. Whether it was desirable,
whether a nonaccommodating policy could have been successfully pursued, and the
consequences for future expectations of inflation of adopting an accommodating
policy are questions that have yet to be resolved.
APPENDIX A
Price indexes for 54 Manufacturing industries
Quarterly indexes were constructed for two-digit manufacturing industries based
on the 1967 input-output tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.9 Because of
the absence of prices for many products and the desire to avoid overlap between the
input and output price indexes for the same industry, the BEA industries were
redefined to obtain the most appropriate classification [41. The redefined industries
represent 76 percent of total gross output in 1967 of manufacturing sectors 14
through 64 of the BEA input-output matrix. Even after redefinition, the price
indexes for many industries are at best only crudely representative of the total inputs
or output of the industry. The overall results will be reasonably reliable if the errors
of omission tend to cancel out.
Output prices. The wholesale product prices at the seven-digit level of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics pertaining to manufacturing were all assigned to four-digit SIC
industries. Within four-digit industries the prices were weighted by their relative
importance in the BLS index for December 1971. The four-digit indexes were
combined into two-digit 10 industry series according to gross output in the 1967 JO
tables. The error produced by combining weights for different years, 1967 and
1971, should not be serious. Gaps in the individual price series over the period
covered were filled by interpolation or linking to comparable series when available.
input prices. The construction of the input-price indexes began with 1974
weights used by the BEA for its annual deflators of intermediate input prices for
9A11 datasenes were constructed for the period first-quarter 1968 to first-quarter 1975 for use in the lag
regressions.The estimateof foreigninfluences used dataafter first-quarter972only.PHILLIP CAGAN 1 I
each industry.'0 The BEA weights pertain to general classes of inputs and were
decomposed as far as was possible into specific materials according to the value of
inputs reported in the 1967 Census of Manufactures for four-digit industries. The
basis of the input weights is therefore a cross between 1967 and 1974 values. A
tentative set of weights was constructed from these two sources. Inputs of industries
not reported in the census or input amounts not reported in a usable form were not
represented in the weights. In effect, the disregarded four-digit industries were
assumed to use inputs in the same porportions as did the covered four-digit
industries in the same two-digit 10 industry.
The wholesale product prices were then assigned to this tentative set of weights.
All wholesale price series that appeared to be a reasonable match or proxy for an
input material were used. Where two or more series were appropriate for a
particular input, they were combined by their BLS weights for December 1971 and
used as one series. Series were used as inputs for all the industries in which they
were appropriate, except that, as previously noted, overlap was avoided by omitting
manufacturing price series as inputs into the industry in which they served as part of
the output index. The input series use 419 of the 2500-odd wholesale price series at
the seven-digit level. As with the output indexes, the input-price series were
interpolated, linked, and if necessary dropped, for periods in which gaps existed.
The BLS kindly provided data for gaps in publication of some series for the earlier
years. Where no price series was available for a particular input, the weight for that
input was dropped and absorbed by the others. The final set of weights represented
the relative importance of the input prices included.
Construction of indexes of materials costs in production presents difficulties,
since many prices for important materials and the volume of specific inputs in many
industries are not available. The indexes constructed were made as comprehensive
as the available data permitted and, though the best that appear possible at present,
for some of the industries the coverage is extremely poor. lt is not known how the
exclusion of some prices affects the indexes. We might conjecture that the avail-
able prices tend to overrepresent more homogeneous commodities sold in active
markets. They may therefore tend to be more volatile than prices of the unrep-
resented commodities. If so, the input-price indexes exhibit excessive amplitude of
fluctuation.
Prices of world-traded input materials. Each input price was classified according
to the fraction of its total domestic supply that is imported or exported. The fraction
pertains to 1971 and is from the Bureau of the Census (2], supplemented in some
cases from other sources. Where the fraction for a particular input was not
available, the figure for the aggregate group of which it is part was used. The
distribution of these fractions for all input prices is shown in Table 2. A fraction of
20 percent or above was selected as indicating that a product was world traded and
iheBEA kindly supplied their deflator weights. The BEA price series were not used in this study.
because they are annual series only. and were not used even as annuai benchmarks because their
coverage ts far less detailed than is desired.12: MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING
its price entirely determined abroad. This is the fraction for grains, an important
contributor to inflation in 1973; furthermore, the weight in input indexes of products
just below this cutoff figure is small. The prices of these world-traded products are
not necessarily entirely determined abroad: the degree of determination undoubtedly
differs among them. No other ready method of selection appeared preferable.
however. The value of these world-traded products comprises 10 percent of the
value of shipments of the fifty-four industries.
TABLE 2
DismiBu'rloN OF INPUT PRICES BY DEGREE THEY ARE WORLD TRADED
We,ghi in Total input Maierials
Degree imported or Exported Numberofinputs of 54 industries
(percent)
o to less than 0.05 96 20.8
0.05" 0.10 118 20.1
0.10" 0.15 73 25.2
0.15 " 0.16 13 8.1
0.16" 0.17 10 1.1
0.17 " 0.18 848 1.715.1
0.18 " 0.19 13 2.8
0.19 " 0.20 4 14
0.20 and over 84 18.8
TOTAL 419 100.0
Themonthly changes in world-traded prices in each industry, scaled by their
input weight. were divided by the corresponding monthly total input-price index to
give the part of the percent change in input prices attributable to world-traded
goods. The monthly percent changes were cumulated to derive the quarterly percent
changes used in the analysis. The index for world-traded inputs may imperfectly
reflect prices actually paid. even more than is usual for reported prices of domestic
products, because of differences between domestic and world price quotations for
the same product. (Because of the importance of changes in price of imported crude
petroleum in 1973—74, the domestic BLS price was replaced by the refinery-
acquisition cost of imports of this commodity [6, p. 17]. Its input weight in the
petroleum industry was set at the 1974 world-traded fraction of 30 percent rather
than at the 1967 fraction of 13 percent.'2)
The proportion of domestic and world-traded goods actually included in the
indexes affects the division of input-price changes into domestic and world sources.
If a particular input is not priced by the BLS. it is not covered in our input-price
indexes, even though it may be an important domestic or world-traded item.
''The world-traded producis comprise 18.8percent byweight of totalinputmaterials, as shossn in
Table 2. Total input materials as a percentage of total shipments average (by final demand eights 54
percent in the covered industries. World-traded inputs as a fraction of shipments are therefore 0. I hi)
x 0.54 =) 10.2 percent,
The coverage of imports and exports can be found b' calculating the total ss eight in output of the
world-traded fraction for all inputs. This weight is 7.3 percent. The percentage of imports and exports
in total shipments in the input-output table for these industries is 6.0 percent. so the coverage is slightls
too high.
'2According to data collected by Avram Kisselgoff as part of his National Bureau study of oil pres.
imported crude comprised 30 percent of total domestic consumption by value at thc end of 074.PHILLIP CAGAN :13
Omissions are therefore important, though they do not clearly bias the indexes
one way or the other.
APPENDIX B
The Cumulative Effect of Price Increases of Inputs
The output price of industry i at time t, P,1, can be viewed as determined iden-
tically by its value-added costs, v,1, and the prices of inputs from all other indus-
tries. Let a, be the weight in the output of industry i of the input from industryj.
The effects of input price changes are distributed over three quarters as estimated.
The lagged effects of the concurrent and two previous quarters in industry i may be
denoted by f, fi2, J, which are constrained to total unity. Then for industry
i the output price can be expressed as
P, =v,,+f + f,2aP11_i+fa,P,_2. (1)
It may be noted that the effect of the input from an industry's own output, a11, is not
zero inasmuch as the industries are broadly defined and output from one part is used
in other parts. Also, some firms use some of their own production as an input.
By definition, for each industry i, the weight of inputs from industries covered in
our schema plus the contribution of inputs from industries not covered (comprising
nonmanufacturing and, for want of price data, some manufacturing industries) and
of the value added items sums to unity. The assumption was made that prices of
labor and other value-added items, purchased services, and imports are not affected
by feedback, but all other uncovered input prices have the same percentage change
as the prices of covered inputs. This was accomplished for each industry by raising
the weights of the inputs a, from the covered industries I to n by h, where
ha =— v,+ (services and imports per unit) 2 I If P J
The effect of a rise in the prices of world-traded goods is derived in two steps.
First, the initial effect on industry prices is found by deriving the increase in
materials costs due to price increases of world-traded goods. Second, given the
initial rise in prices for each industry, the effect on all industries is given by
equation (1). The equation is solved recursively to give the effect from quarter
to quarter.
The solution can be presented in simple terms with the use of matrix notation.
Since the value-added items and service prices are assumed constant, their change is
zero. The lag terms form a set of three diagonal matrices, where the matrix F1 has a
main diagonal of fii ,f21 and zeros elsewhere, and similarly for F2 and14:MONEY,CREDIT, ANDBANKING
F3. The adjustment factors h, in (2) form a similar diagonal matrix H. Denote FkH
by Lk. The matrix of direct requirements of output for inputs from the n covered
industries is A ={a,}.The rate of change of output prices for the n covered
industries forms a column vector denoted P,. The equation of price changes in
matrix notation can then be written
P1 =L,AP,+ L2AP1_1 + L3AP,_2. (3)
The initial effect on the output price of each industry of price increases in
world-traded goodsmay be represented by the column vector W,. The elements
are the contribution of world-traded goods to percentage changes in input
materials costs for each industry, scaled by the weight of input materials in the
output of the industry. To incorporate these effects, we add F,W1 + F2W1_,
+ F3W,_2 to the above equation and solve for P1 to obtain
P, =(I—L1AY'(L2AP1_I + L3AP1_2 + F,W,
+ F2W1_, + F3W,_2), (4)
where I is the identity mathx.
An overall price change C1 is found by averaging the industry changes, each
weighted by its share of final demand, S =(s1,s2, ., sn),
C,=SP1. (5)
Atthe conclusion of the time sequence of these effects, t = T,the price index
C is the accumulation of all the intervening quarterly changes,
c= fl(l + C1).
The total effect of a one-time change in input prices Wo may be written
PT =FIHAPT+ F2HAPT + F3HAPT + F,W0 + F2W0 + F3W0. (6)
Since F, + F2 + F3 =I,we have
PT =(I
—HA)'W0 . (7)
Suppose,as an example, all industries were the same size, used the same fraction
of world-traded goods, and allwerethe same because of a devaluation of the
currency. The overall change would be the same for each industry:
CT =PT=___________ . (8) —PHILLIP CAGAN :15
The reciprocal of the denominator gives the multiplier of the long-run effect of W
on P. For the manufacturing industries the average h1a, for all i is 0.543 and the
multiplier is 2.19.
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